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Archive 1Archive 3Archive 4Archive 5

German strength and casualties, recent edits

A recent series of anon edits have been changing the strength and casualties of the Germans on this article.


Overall strength: Online forum post by a former respected forum member within the military history community, but no sources: [1]

Unit specific strength:
9th SS Panzer Division: 3,500 men[2][3]) enlarged into Kampfgruppe 'Hohenstaufen' (13,594 men[4])
10th SS Panzer Division (3,000 men) enlarged into Kampfgruppe 'Frundsberg' (3,800 men[5])
107th Panzer Brigade (2,117 men[6]) of 25th Panzergrenadier Division

The user seems to be using all this to come to a total of 19,511 Germans deployed to opposed Operation Market Garden.

Casualties: Quite a number of references were posted some time ago and are available in the archives, which discuss the numbers of Germans killed and wounded (or the calculations to arrive at such). There were also several quotes and references posted to that indicated that sources providing the number of killed and wounded have not included those captured (for example, It Never Snows in September) etc. A new source was added by the anon user: [7] The business insider article does not directly reference any sources, but it does link to It Never Snows In September for its casualty range (per Kershaw, killed and wounded only).

What do the sources say?

Based off Kershaw's Appendix C: A Note on German Casualties During Operation Market-Garden 17-26 Sep 44 (339ff.), the German force was around 25,000 men strong. However, he only provides strength in round numbers, for those were figures exist, and for those forces that saw casualties. This particular list is not as indepth as his OOB provided in Appendix B.

  • Arnhem area included the 9th SS, Division von Tettau, and various other kampfgruppen: 9,257–10,357 (at least one unit's reported strength is marked as "over 600" and several include minor ranges).
  • Around the corridor included Kampfgruppen Walther, Panzer Brigade 107, 10th SS, 59th Infantry Division (with attached elements from the 3rd and 5th Fallschirmjager Divisions), and about 20 other kampfgruppen: around 15,000 men, with no reported strength for the panzer brigade.
  • It is unclear if the roughly 6,000 men of the 20 kampfgruppen stated to be around the corridor include the Division Erdmann, the 9th Panzer, Kampfgruppe Chill/85th Infantry, the 116th Panzer, the 176th Infantry, the 363rd Volksgrenadier, the 406th Infantry, and 719th Infantry Divisions that are all mentioned in the text. Did the training regiment from the Hermann Goering Division suffer losses and are they included in either breakdown that Kershaw provides?

Zagola would seem to suggest at least 25,000 men facing Second Army at the beginning of the operation (pp.15–17):

  • The 176th Infantry Division was opposite the 11th Armoured Division, with no strength given in the text. The 85th Infantry Division/Kg Chill faced the Guards Armoured Division with around 4,250 men. The 719th Infantry was opposite the 7th Armoured Division with around 4,500 men. Behind Kg Chill was Kg/Division Walther and Division Erdmann. The latter is reported to have had around 5,000 men, and no reported strength is provided for Walter. He noted that the most significant source of reinforcements in the opening stage of the fighting was the training regiment for the Hermann Goring Division that had swelled to 12,000 by the end of August. He also notes that beyond these units, the 82nd Airborne picked up prisoners from at least 28 different units within the opening stage of the fighting, prior to the arrival of major formations, which indicated the "jumble" of MP, LOC, and occupation units that were behind the dedicated fighting forces.
  • Additional forces in the area (pp.18–20) included the 406th Division (no strength provided); Panzer-Brigade 107 with 2,117 men and 36 Panthers; 10th SS with 7,142 men, 16 Panzer IV, 4 StuGs, and 21 Jagdpanzers; 9th SS (no strength provided other than 5 Panthers and 21 Jagdpanzers), 1./s.PzJg.Abt. 559: 6 Jagdpanzer; StuG-Brigade 280: 10 StuGs; and Fallschirm-StuF-Brigade 12: 5 Stugs.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:52, 15 August 2022 (UTC)
  • I would note that Zagola highlights the 10th SS contained 7,142 men, although only 3,800 were combat troops (the figure the anon cited). The allied strength figure includes all forces assigned to a particular formation (combat infantry, signals, medical, arty etc.). We cannot use the German bayonet strength and compare that to the all-inclusive Allied strength as it misrepresents both sides. For example, the paper strength of a British para battalion was about 600 men with a bayonet strength of about half of that if we strip away the admin, signals, artillery, medical etc. You don't see anyone undercutting the Allied strength, so it seems like cherry-picking and misrepresentation to do the same for the Germans.
  • Zagola, p. 85: map for the end of the battle: 719th ID facing the British 49th; German 245th ID facing the British 53rd; 59th, Kg Chill and 712th ID facing elements of the British Guards, 15th, 50th and the 101st AB. Div Tettau, 9th and 10th SS facing the British 43rd, 1st AB and elements of the Guards; the 84th, 190th, and 406th IDs facing the 82nd AB; Div/KG Walther facing the British 11th Arm; 180th ID facing the 3rd British division; Div Erdmann and the 176th ID facing the Belgium brigade and the 4th Armoured Brigade. The 183rd ID had also been pushed back during this period, but that was by the 12th Army Group.

Reynolds: Pretty much states what the note states (First Para having 30,000 men in various stages of training and II SS Pnz Corps having around 14,000 men), for what it is worth.

German official history: Does not provide a figure for the total forces involved but does indicate the involvement of the following formations: 9th SS, 10th SS, 59th ID, 85th ID, 190th ID, 245th ID, 406th ID, 712th ID, KG Walther, KG Erdmann, and the 6th Parachute Regiment. These are supplemented by additional KG and the map indicates the 176th sitting astride the corridor holding the line (vol. VII, p. 666).

Russell A. Hart, Mission Impossible? The Mobilization of the German Replacement Army and its Role in the Thwarting of Operation 'Market Garden', 17–18 September 1944, stated that on 18 September the 406th counterattacked with just under 2,000 men (its then actual strength). Its reported strength, based off information from several days before, was 2,671 men.

Stephen Craig, A Medical Bridge Too Far: Medical Support to Operation Market-Garden, September 17–26, 1944, wrote by 20 Sepmteber, Model was gathering a total force of 82,000 fighting men to launch a counteroffensive.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:34, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light, p. 282: "another 85,000 Germans flooded the battlefield in barely a week".EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:36, 16 August 2022 (UTC)

Response

@EnigmaMcmxc:, you need to sign your inputs, so people know that it is you who started this section and wrote what is above after reverting my 2 edits not entirely in WP:GOODFAITH. In the Operation Market Garden ("OMG") participated only 3 big German units: Kampfgruppe 'Hohenstaufen' ("9th Kg") w/ 13,594 men, Kampfgruppe 'Frundsberg' ("10th Kg") w/ 3,800 men and 107th Panzer Brigade ("107 PB") w/ 2,117 men. Zaloga confirms the numbers 3,800 and 2,117 on pp. 19 & 20 respectively you can see online. The number 13,594 is from referenced book Im Feuersturm letzter Kriegsjahre by Wilhelm Tieke in German, but still the "Bible" on the subject, as quoting original German records, which do exist, and in its 3rd edition, so quite reliable (the blog was referenced only as a translation for those not knowing German). So, how those provided by me sources are not reliable, as per WP:RELIABLE, please?

I am sorry, if you do not understand German, but not understanding reliable sources does not deem them unreliable. Right? But 2 other numbers were confirmed by Zaloga, so all together with 13,594 broken down to minute details, some of which confirmed elsewhere, seemed quite reliable. Right?

Additionally, the provided number of 19,511 men, as total German forces in OMG, is quite close to Kershaw's rounded 25,000, so rather confirmed too. Right? Zaloga's 25,000 is only a suggestion, so it does not count, as a source. Right?

All other WP's provide the number of German casualties at 3,300-8,000 depending on sources, so for a good reason. If you take the average of 5,600 and add to 19,511 you will get the total of 25,111 provided by Kershaw, as 19,511 was the number of those in German units on Sep. 24, 1944. Right?

And the common sense dictates that, if there had been 100,000 German troops in OMG, not a single Allied soldier would have survived, as according to Allied official data 12 Allied soldiers were on a par w/ only 10 German for obvious reasons. Allies attacked only having 2:1 advantage. So, why to provide the nonsensical number of 100,000 Germans from Reynold? It does not make any sense at first glance. So why?

Why do you insist on perpetuation obvious lies?--108.41.129.35 (talk) 01:42, 16 August 2022 (UTC)

You have just stated that you chose what to include and what not to in your edit (i.e. cherry picking). Four out of the six sources you provided were not reliable (an unsourced forum post, an unsourced article from a business website, and two websites that lack source information. Mixing and matching them to explain what another source states does not fly.).
Per Wikipedia:No original research, we report what the sources state - not what we think they mean or how we interpret what they state. In this case, you deliberately decided to omit all information from Zagola that you do not agree with (i.e. that were was more German formations than the three you decided to build your case on, and that there were more German troops in one of them). Zagola provides a breakdown of nearly all the German forces, on the pages you cited, at the beginning of the operation (outlined in the above section). You chose to ignore them to decrease the size of the German force involved. The policy also means that we provide ranges, based off the differences in what sources report (hence the casualty range; 3,300 was only ever referenced as the losses incurred around Arnhem and cannot be used as the starting basis for the German losses for the entire battle - the scope of this article).
Should the infobox be updated based off more source information? Yes. Should it reflect there being only 19,000 German troops opposing OMG? No, because no source states that even the ones you are citing. Based off just the small selection above, the sources tell us that there were over 25,000 German troops manning the frontline at the start of the operation, with more in-depth up to Arnhem (several sources, for example, indicate that the First Parachute Army contained 30,000 men (I have also seen 18-20,000 men cited as its strength too). That army - to the best of my knowledge - during this operation provided three major units: the men manning a part of the front line, Kg Walther, and Division Erdmann. All were involved in the fighting, and that army alone outnumbers the figure you are citing). At least one source indicates that by the end of the operation, the German force was around 85,000 men strong.
I mean, if we want to go further and talk about further updates to the infobox: the British casualty figure includes all losses incurred by the Second Army. However, the section above it only references the size of XXX Corps rather than the entirety of the Second Army.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:47, 16 August 2022 (UTC)
@EnigmaMcmxc:, you really seem to be away from WP:GOODFAITH.
1. Proposing Kershaw's rounded 25,000 is consistent w/ Wikipedia:No original research, as his writings are respected and secondary. My calculation of adding median 5,600 casualties to 19,511 men as of Sep. 24,'44 is just to verify and not to make a source. 2 constitute components of 19,511, namely 3,800 and 2,117, are confirmed by Zaloga that makes 19,511 be credible also, as so detailed and from Im Feuersturm letzter Kriegsjahre by Wilhelm Tieke in German. Not knowing German is not an excuse to dismiss that or any other authoritative source.
2. All German formations at OMG are listed in detail in the blog provided for convenience, as the Tieke's source is in German. By confirming 2 numbers of men in 2 of 3 umbrella units, Zaloga confirmed not only the credibility of the numbers, but also the composition of the umbrella units: 2 Kampfgruppen (9th & 10th Kg) & 107 PB. Zagola's breakdown of the German forces is included in, and fully consistent with the blog list confirming its reliability in addition to the numer confirmation by Zaloga.
3. If "over 25,000 German troops manning the frontline at the start of the operation", as you suggest, all Allied forces would have been dead on the 1st and max. 2nd day of OMG. In 1940, 360 German paratroopers landed on the roof of Fort Eben-Emael and disabled 3,000 Belgian troop until the fort surrendered. "In less than 15 minutes, 13 or 14 tanks, two anti-tank guns, and 13 to 15 transport vehicles had been destroyed by Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, the majority attributed to Wittmann" in Normandy in 1944. You seem not noticing how effective were German soldiers and how poorly trained were Allied.
4. 85,000 German troops you alleged would have constituted 8.5 full strength divisions or rather 17 half-full, as they were not even that after retreating from Normandy. Where do you have listed 17 German divisions? Only 2 of II. SS Panzer Korps participated: the 9th, 10th. All other units involved were small, except 107 PB: of 1. Fallschirm-Armee (LXXXVIII. Armeekorps) made of only remnants of 719, 85, 94, 89, 6, 176, 353 Div's, e.g. Kg Walther of 4 battalions (one Waffen-SS Bataillon, one Heeresersatzbataillon, one Artillerie-Batallion, and a Heeres FlaK-Batallion); of Korps Feldt, e.g. Kg Stargaard less than 1 bn of 405 Div., Kg Fuerstenberg (500 men w/ tanks) of 405 Div., Kg Greschick (500 men), Kg Becker & Kg Hermann (700 men) made of remnants of 3rd & 5th Fj Div., of KG von Tettau, e.g. Kg Kraft. Divisions were reduced to just a few hundred men. That is the key. You need to check those numbers to see, which source is credible. You seem to repeat absurd numbers ignoring even Zaloga.
5. Operation Market Garden order of battle#German forces lists reduced units up to big distance from OMG, most of which did not participate in OMG. You confirm that. Thus listing all German units in the surrounding front is very inaccurate and misleading. Hence, remains only the number provided by Kershaw, as only one pertaining specifically to OMG, and not the entire German front.
6. This article is based on the historic lie perpetuated by the Allies also due Gen. Gavin's fault for OMG failure, as described in detail by TIK on YouTube from 1:38 hr. I will correct the article for the last time. If you reverse my edit, I will open a dispute case against you for violating WP:GOODFAITH.--68.237.69.219 (talk) 03:45, 18 August 2022 (UTC)
You may want to just go ahead and open the dispute now then, if you edit the article again to insert a ridiculously unsourced cherrypicked low number (that just ignores all the other sources out there that contradict it) - that edit will be reverted.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:53, 18 August 2022 (UTC)
Wikipedia:Third opinion requestedEnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:47, 18 August 2022 (UTC)

Gavin

The article should mention it was Gavin's failure to reach his objectives that ensured the failure of the operation. (86.132.175.231 (talk) 18:27, 5 June 2022 (UTC))

Original Research and unfounded at that, is not permissible here. HammerFilmFan (talk) 00:48, 11 February 2023 (UTC)

Reliability of Sources

There needs to be a cull of sections related to unreliable sources. The paragraph relating to Monty rejecting Dempsey’s concerns is referenced to Hibbert, who takes it directly from Ryan, yet there is zero primary evidence to support it relating to MG. Comet was cancelled due to these very concerns. And any reference to Ryan should be confirmed with a primary source before use, as even the Cornelius Ryan Archives show that many events in the book did not exist.2405:6E00:296:D0C1:B453:615:74B1:3AAC (talk) 09:44, 25 November 2022 (UTC)

We go by what the Reliable Sources state - it is not up to editors to confirm "primary sources." VERIFIABILITY, not TRUTH is Wiki's motto. HammerFilmFan (talk) 00:45, 11 February 2023 (UTC)
Yes.
We could however discuss whether Ryan is a reliable source, when compared to real historians. Cornelius Ryan was not a historian and A Bridge Too Far (book) is a populist 'account', not a history book.
Therefore, IMO, in the case above, if actual historians say that Monty didn't reject Dempsey’s concerns, and that can be sourced, then WP:SOURCESDIFFER and either both should be included or Ryan's opinion should be given its due (lesser) weight. Shimbo (talk) 11:00, 11 February 2023 (UTC)

Article too long

This article seems too long to me. For example, it is longer than the Battle of the Bulge, a much larger, long lasting, and important event. Some sections such as "Logistics" are not about Market Garden, but the situation in Europe as a while. (Logistics were indeed a major problem, but a section on logistics needs more focus.) The section titled "Summary" is well written but seems rather strange to me. A summary of the subject is already in the opening paras, and this section seems redundant although some text may be useful elsewhere. So, barring howls of protest, I plan to shorten the article by 10 to 20 percent. Comments? Smallchief

I imagine that the article could be cut down considerably. The entire battle section for example, could be rewrote as a shorter summary of the Battle of Arnhem and Battle of Nijmegen articles, for example (obviously including additional info outside the scope of those two articles). To your point about logistics, there are more recent articles that cover the situation in depth now: British logistics in the Siegfried Line campaign, American services and supply in the Siegfried Line campaign, American transportation in the Siegfried Line campaign. So, potential for again decreasing to a short summary and linking there.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:15, 12 August 2023 (UTC)

'Lieutenant General Wilhelm Bittrich'

This description, in the 'German preparation' paragraph, is highly inappropriate. For one thing, Nazi SS officers should not be accorded normal military ranks. For another, following his promotion in August 1944, Bittrich was an SS-Obergruppenfuhrer und General der Waffen-SS, equivalent to full general despite his only holding a corps and not an army command. The SS equivalent of lieutenant-general would be one step down, SS-Gruppenfuhrer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS. Khamba Tendal (talk) 19:08, 18 March 2024 (UTC)

British Guardsmen did NOT operate tanks after dark

XXX Corps commander General Horrocks had expected that the Irish Guards would have been able to advance the 13 miles (21 km) to Eindhoven within two-three hours. However, in the event, they started out at 14:35, 2 hours AFTER the first airborne units were ON THE GROUND and only covered 7 miles (11 km) to Valkenswaard before stopping at nightfall, already 4 hours behind schedule. The plan was for Guard to reach Eindhoven [another 6 miles, (9.7 km) further] just after 17:00 in order to relieve 1st Airborne in Arhem in 48 hours. But, they did not restart for 8 hours, making them a full 12 hours behind schedule. Where was Montgomery's urgency during this loss of 12 precious hours?


Montgomery's tanks DID NOT OPERATE AFTER DARK! William Buckingham wrote in his "Arnhem 1944"(2002) pages 119-120:


"By the time the British Liberation Army set foot on the European mainland, the dictum that armour ONLY FOUGHT BY DAY and carried out maintenance and rearming after dark appears to have become set in stone. It is unclear where this originated. The practice may have grown out of the unreliability and heavy maintenance demands of British tanks earlier in the war [see example John Ellis"The Sharp End" p.126], although the advent of the US-produced M4 Sherman, with its exemplary reliability should have done much to offset this. it may also have been a carry over from the long years of training in the UK between Dunkirk [where the British lost ALL of their tanks and heavy equipment and had to train on obsolete, worn out equipment] and the Normandy invasion. Certainly, the British tank crew training in the run up to the Normandy invasion had to make a conscious effort to break potentially lethal habits engendered by peacetime-training regulations [see example John Foley "Mailed Fist" pp 17-18]. During static phases in the Normandy fighting it became standard practice for British tanks to move up to the line in the pre-dawn darkness and to withdraw after dark [I am indebted to Mr Robert Field of TankNet Military Discussion Forum for bringing this to my attention. The information appears in Tim Saunders', "Hell's Highway” (Battleground Europe Series)].


"This practice appears to have been largely based on the assumption that tanks were too vulnerable to operate in darkness. However Germans, and more especially the Soviets, did not subscribe to this view. Nor, incidentally, did everyone in the British and Canadian armies in North-West Europe. Operation "Totalize," launched by the 2nd Canadian Corps, on the night of 7-8 August 1944 saw a large force Canadian and British tanks and armoured infantry pass virtually unscathed through strong German defences along the Caen-Falaise road. They achieved what they had repeatedly failed to do in daylight, because the darkness nullified the expertly sited German anti-tank guns. But the Guards Armoured Division being Guardsmen, and thus not the most flexible of formations, preferred to limit their offensive activities to the hours of daylight. Sbrenerkener (talk) 20:01, 24 August 2023 (UTC)

It's obviously not true that British tanks did not operate at night, because they did so in Totalize and then again on the night of 30-31 August when Horrocks ordered 11th Armoured to keep going all night to Amiens, a 30-mile rush. It was dangerous to operate tanks at night in enemy territory because the low visibility gave the advantage to infantry, and difficult in any case because the vehicles (even American Shermans) needed laborious regular evening servicing at the end of the day's run. But at Amiens on the morning of 31 August, 11th Armoured captured General Eberbach, commander Seventh German Army, who drove into the town square in his staff car, thinking he was inspecting his own front-line positions, only to find that the British front line had advanced thirty miles overnight, a thing he had not considered possible, and he was now in British hands.
Guards Armoured Division were not ordered to drive through the night of 17-18 September in Market Garden because Colonel Sink of the 506th PIR, US 101st Airborne, decided for reasons best known to himself that he couldn't be bothered to take his principal first-day objective of Eindhoven after all (despite it being held by only about half a dozen Flak 88 gun crews -- there really weren't many Germans there), leaving it till next day, not least because (well, hello) Sink didn't think his paratroopers could fight at night, and in addition Sink's 506th had also failed to take their other objectives, the canal bridge at Son (blown by the enemy because Sink's paratroops got distracted and were too slow), or the alternate bridge at Best (because again Sink's paratroops were too slow and allowed the enemy to reinforce the location and prevent capture), so the Irish Guards couldn't get much further until the Royal Engineers had built a replacement Bailey bridge at Son anyway. Hence no order to Guards Armoured to drive through the night. Khamba Tendal (talk) 18:59, 18 March 2024 (UTC)
Dempsey did not want to advance too closely to Eindhoven as the Germans may have blown the bridges before the 101st had seized them. Cirillo of the US army states this. There is nothing stating that tanks would not be used at night. As it happened it made no difference as XXX Corps had to erect a Bailey bridge at Zon during the night as the 101st failed to seize the bridge. 2A01:4B00:BB18:A600:E738:4C0D:38F4:6829 (talk) 17:04, 4 July 2024 (UTC)
Rubbish, the ONLY reason they did not advance further from Lent was because they were ambushed in the dark and had no infantry support as those troops were left in Nijmegen to clear the town that the 82nd had not done when they failed to capture the bridge early.
there was no “dictum” and Buckingham has not reference to back this statement up. Enderwigginau (talk) 04:50, 28 July 2024 (UTC)

The Germans punished the people

The Germans did not “cut off” supplies to the Netherlands, they were stripping the country to feed their own retreating soldiers. The Winter Hunger is discussed thoroughly in many books, and not one states that it occurred purposefully to punish the Dutch people. If they intentionally did it, why did they allow aid shipments from Allied forces to be dropped? Enderwigginau (talk) 05:10, 28 July 2024 (UTC)

Ryan's book

This article is heavily influenced and based on Cornelius Ryan's book, a 'A Bridge Too Far'. The article is spattered with references to the book. In a letter by Ryan's assistant to a Daphne Du Maurier, it says "Mr Ryan's book will not be factual and documentary". Letter is in the Ohio University papers, box 107. All passages referencing Ryan should be reviewed and/or removed. . 143.58.176.154 (talk) 13:07, 27 July 2024 (UTC)

Please provide references to support your assertion. 10mmsocket (talk) 13:11, 27 July 2024 (UTC)
It was given. Read again. 143.58.176.154 (talk) 13:15, 27 July 2024 (UTC)
Tell us here exactly where it is determined by modern historians (or equivalent) that Ryan's work is no longer a reliable source. Please don't edit war on the article until you obtain proper consensus here. 10mmsocket (talk) 15:06, 27 July 2024 (UTC)
You are confused. A reference that Ryan's book is not a reliable factual account was given in this talk page, as was a passage from the letter. Twice you have written one was not given. No passages with Ryan references have been removed from the article.
The article was improved with references added according to Wikipedia guidelines.
You deleted text inserted by a few editors asking justification to satisfy YOU rather than act in accordance to Wikipedia guidelines. You must not delete referenced text because you do not like or do not understand it.
YOU are entering into an edit war, no one else, you persist in deleting referenced text by a number of editors. It is also obvious you know next to nothing about this historical event. 143.58.176.154 (talk) 15:28, 27 July 2024 (UTC)
The reference given above is an unverifiable Primary source and hence not suitable for use here - where has this been discussed in reliable sources? In addition, edits by IP editors (who appear to be the same person) have removed high quality sources (including Beevor) and replaced them by vague references that are unverifiable. Bring your sources here so they can be discussed.Nigel Ish (talk) 15:36, 27 July 2024 (UTC)
Note that this editor is under investigation for block evasion and sockpuppetry at Wikipedia:Sockpuppet investigations/Wisdom-inc. In the meantime this article has been semi-protected for a month. @Nigel Ish has there been any damage to the article by this editor that would merit revering back to a version in the past? 10mmsocket (talk) 15:40, 27 July 2024 (UTC)
The obvious changes today appear have been reverted - I don't know whether this goes back any further though.Nigel Ish (talk) 15:43, 27 July 2024 (UTC)
Thank you. 10mmsocket (talk) 15:43, 27 July 2024 (UTC)
Numerous issues with Ryan and other have been presented here in the past and ignored by those of you gatekeeping the article.
Perhaps you should attempt to perform some actual research, unlike Cornelius Ryan, before labelling others as sock puppets.
It is very interesting that similar comments on this talk page in the past have been removed. Enderwigginau (talk) 05:01, 28 July 2024 (UTC)
Numerous issues with Ryan do not appear to have been discussed here - apart from the above, the only discussion is Talk:Operation_Market_Garden/Archive_5#Reliability_of_Sources - which did not present any real arguments about why his work should be discounted.Nigel Ish (talk) 08:23, 28 July 2024 (UTC)
Have the comments been removed or archived? There's a difference. As for your allegations of "gatekeeping", what has happened is nothing like the unacceptable behaviour set out in WP:OWN. Instead it has been about reverting damage to the article caused by a block-evading sockpuppet. Nobody else's contributions have been challenged, so I fail to see how that is "gatekeeping" or ownership behaviour. I would encourage you to read WP:AGF before making further comment. 10mmsocket (talk) 11:50, 28 July 2024 (UTC)
  1. ^ Klages, Ron (11 July 2004). "German armor at Market Garden". Feldgrau.net. Retrieved 13 August 2022.
  2. ^ "Order of Battle and Operational Details - German units - battle of Arnhem". Market Garden Foundation. Retrieved 14 August 2022.
  3. ^ "De Slag om Arnhem vanuit Duits perspektief". ARS Website. Retrieved 14 August 2022.
  4. ^ Tieke, Wilhelm (1975). Im Feuersturm letzter Kriegsjahre: II. SS-Panzerkorps mit 9. u. 10. SS-Division "Hohenstaufen" u. "Frundsberg" (in German) (1 ed.). Osnabruck. ISBN 3921242185.
  5. ^ Zaloga 2014, p. 19.
  6. ^ Zaloga 2014, p. 20.
  7. ^ Brimelow, Benjamin (15 September 2020). "76 years ago, the Allies launched the largest airborne attack ever — here's how it all went wrong". Insider Inc. Retrieved 14 August 2022.